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ABSTRACT  ARTICLE INFO 
Introduction: Indonesia has signed, and is in the process of signing,
many bilateral and regional Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Whether
these trade agreements will benefit Indonesia on the economic front or 
not is still a matter for discussion. Background Problem: Signing TPP, 
raises many questions as to how this would affect the countries in Asian
regions, including Indonesia. Novelty: Considering the criticism of CGE 
(Computer General Equilibrium) model, this paper uses the SMART
simulation model, based on a partial equilibrium approach, to estimate
the aggregate and commodity-level gains and losses for Indonesia with its
partner countries during the post-tariff elimination period. Research 
Method: This study uses the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade
Solution (WITS) Database. This database contains trade data for all the
countries under a different nomenclature viz. at the two-digit, four-digit, 
and six-digit level. We use the HS-classified nomenclature at the six-digit 
level in order to estimate the impact of the removal of tariffs on
Indonesia’s trade, i.e. both exports and imports. Findings: The finding 
reveals that if Indonesia does not take part in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, it will still have a trade surplus of $1.6 billion
with the Trans-Pacific countries but joining the bloc would result in a
trade deficit of $19 million. Joining the bloc would increase the imports
from Japan, followed by the United States and Australia as against an 
increase in exports to the United States, followed by Malaysia and
Vietnam. The post Trans-Pacific Partnership period will have many
implications for Indonesia, it may face difficulties exporting to the
member countries, even with an existing trade agreement, while in the
long run the Trans-Pacific Partnership bloc could limit Indonesia’s trade
prospects with these Pacific Rim countries and it may limit Indonesia
influencing WTO outcomes. Conclusion: Trade agreements seem to have 
benefited Indonesia’s economy and its people in many ways over the
years, even though it has an important cost for some people. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesia has signed, and is in the process of 
signing, many bilateral and regional Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs). Whether these trade 
agreements will benefit Indonesia on the 
economic front or not is still a matter for 
discussion. But the signing of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership1 (TPP) agreement raises many 
questions as to how this would affect the 
countries in the Asian region, particularly 
Indonesia. Given the fact that the TPP bloc is 
comprised of countries with a combined GDP of 
over 40% and a population share over 11% 
(World Bank Database, 2017), it raises concerns 
about trade creation and diversion for the non-
participating countries in the region, including 
Indonesia.  
In this context, it is important to assess the 
implications of the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPPA) post its implementation, 
particularly after the domestic ratification 
process has been completed. The TPPA goes far 
beyond trade and tariff negotiations, as it 
includes 29 chapters ranging from issues dealing 
with market access, technical barriers to trade, 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, rules of 
origin, customs cooperation, investment, 
services and legal and institutional aspects of the 
negotiation, and also includes government 
procurement, competition, intellectual property, 
labor and environmental issues (Banga and 
Sahu, 2015). The legal texts cover all the aspects 
of commercial relations among the TPPA 
countries, and they were signed on February 4, 
2016 (Chow, 2016). Given the confidentiality of 
the agreement, the provisions in most of the 
                                                            
1  TPP includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United 
States and Vietnam. The negotiations on this deal 
concluded on October 5, 2015, and was signed on 
February 4, 2016, after 19 rounds of tough negotiations 
over the span of five years. The partner countries are at 
present into the domestic ratification process before the 
agreements enters into force in early 2018. 
chapters have remained out of the public 
domain. Available texts (CPTPP2) in the context 
of the investment provisions indicate the 
formation of legal protection for the investment 
and the investors of each of the TPP partners. 
The TPPA envisages elevating individual 
foreign firms to equal status with the sovereign 
nations. The negotiations aim at providing the 
investors with a non-discriminatory and 
minimum standard of treatment, and restrict the 
performance requirements for foreign invest-
ments. The text aims to include provisions for 
expeditious, investor-state dispute settlement. 
Although the investment chapter has not been 
officially released by the trade negotiators, the 
available document reveals that the TPPA would 
restrict the signatories from regulating foreign 
firms operating within their boundaries, nor can 
they regulate the provisions to acquire land, 
natural resources, or factories, or the right to 
move capital without limits for foreign investors, 
without adequate government review (Petri and 
Michael, 2012). On cross border services, the 
TPP partner countries have agreed on most of 
the cross border service’s text that is likely to 
include an open market for services trading 
(Petri et, al., 2012). Although each of these 
issues needs to be analyzed in detail, the trade 
implications of the TPPA are important for 
Indonesia, mainly because of the involvement of 
many big economies (such as the USA, 
Australia, Japan, and Canada) in the TPPA, 
which are traditionally the major trading partners 
with Indonesia. Given this, the present paper 
estimates the impact of eliminating tariffs on 
Indonesia’s exports and imports during the post 
TPPA scenario. In other words, it finds whether 
the post TPPA scenario helps or hurts 
Indonesia’s trade balance under the assumption 
                                                            
2  CPTPP- Full text of the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,  
http://wtocenter.vn/tpp/full-text-comprehensive-and-
progressive-agreement-trans-pacific-partnership-cptpp  
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of complete tariff elimination between the 
countries party to the agreement. A detailed 
analysis is undertaken to estimate the extent of 
the trade diversion that may take place for the 
member countries, which may adversely affect 
Indonesia's exports to these countries. Further, a 
quantitative assessment is undertaken to study 
the rise in exports and imports to/from different 
member countries in case Indonesia becomes a 
member of the TPPA. The analysis is undertaken 
at the HS3 six-digit disaggregation level to find 
the extent of the gain/loss at the product level 
with different TPP countries.  
While the overall impact is ambiguous at this 
stage, the majority of studies (e.g. Petri et al, 
2012; Deardorff, 2013; Gajdos, 2013) find that 
the present TPP deal would adversely affect 
many economically important countries in the 
region, including Indonesia. Precisely, the 
existing literature (such as Petri et al, 2012; 
Deardorff, 2013; Gajdos, 2013; Xin, 2014) 
which is limited in nature due to the confiden-
tiality clause in the negotiations, has not thrown 
much light on matters for the non-participating 
countries; particularly as there is virtually no 
empirical literature that focuses exclusively on 
the impact of TPP on Indonesia’s trade or any 
other macroeconomic indicators. To a certain 
extent, some of the existing studies (Bergsten; 
2015, Cororation and Orden; 2015, Deardorff; 
2013, Petri et al; 2012, Cheong; 2013) try to 
assess the economic gains and losses for several 
of the participating and non-participating 
countries, including Indonesia, under different 
scenarios. Significantly, these studies (Bergsten; 
2015, Cororation and Orden; 2015, Deardorff; 
2013, Petri et al; 2012, Cheong; 2013) reveal 
                                                            
3  It is Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System or simply known as Harmonized System (HS). It 
is an international nomenclature for the classification of 
products at the international level. The HS for classifying 
goods at a disaggregation level is a six-digit code 
system.  
that the present TPP would bring economic 
losses to Indonesia and other non-participating 
ASEAN countries like Thailand, Cambodia, and 
the Philippines, if they remain out of the 
negotiations. The lack of a distinct analysis of 
the TPP’s effect on Indonesia has necessitated an 
early analysis of the likely impacts of joining or 
not joining the TPP. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
provides a brief review of the existing literature 
and critically evaluates the drawbacks of CGE 
framework in such analysis. Section 3 discusses 
the methodology and data used. Section 4 
reports the trends in Indonesia’s trade with the 
TPP partners at the country level and at the 
product level. Section 5 broadly shows the 
existing trade agreements and tariff pattern with 
the TPP blocs. Section 6 presents two sets of 
results, first, Indonesia’s loss of exports at the 
product-level and the country-level if it does not 
join the TPPA, second, Indonesia’s likely rise in 
exports and imports if it joins TPPA. Section 7 
concludes the finding with some likely impact in 
the post TPP scenarios. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a large amount of literature discussing 
the impact of various trade agreements on 
several macroeconomic indicators of the 
participating countries. But precisely, the 
literature on the impact of the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership is limited in nature because of the 
confidentiality clause in the negotiations. 
Despite this, several studies (Bergsten; 2015, 
Petri et al; 2011, Cheong; 2013, Xin; 2014, 
Deardorff; 2013, and Kenichi; 2011) use the 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
with the Global Trade Analysis Projects (GTAP) 
Database for the quantitative assessments for 
likely gains and losses during the post TPP 
scenario for both the participating and the non-
participating countries.  
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Studies using the CGE framework in the 
estimation of the impact of the TPP on the 
participating and the non-participating countries 
primarily focused on three basic findings viz. 
trade creation and diversion, income effect and 
the welfare effect for each country. Despite the 
growing literature on the shortcomings of the 
CGE modeling (Taylor and Arnim; 2006, 
Charlton and Stiglitz; 2005, Panagariya and 
Duttagupta; 2001, Raza et al; 2014, Bertram and 
Terry; 2014), the majority of these studies in this 
context have used the CGE model to estimate 
the impact of the TPP on the participating and 
the major non-participating countries. We have 
not come across any empirical study which 
exclusively studies the impact of the TPP on 
Indonesia if (or if not) it joins the negotiations. 
However, many of the existing studies, in one 
way or another, assess the possible economic 
losses and gains for Indonesia if it becomes a 
party to the negations or opts out of them.  
Cheong’s (2013) estimations, using a 
recursive dynamic CGE model in three different 
scenarios4 reveals that an expansion of the TPP 
would bring a larger economic loss to Indonesia 
and the other non-participating ASEAN 
countries like Thailand and Vietnam. The results 
suggest that the economic losses of the rest of 
the ASEAN countries increase to 0.37% of GDP 
as a sub-region of ASEAN. Petri, Plummer, and 
Zhai (2011) examined the benefits and the gains 
generated by three tracks, namely the TPP track, 
the Asian track and the FTAAP (Free Trade 
Area of the Asia Pacific) over 2010-2025. The 
study reveals that the income for Indonesia 
under the present TPP track would decline by 
US$ -3.5 billion by the year end of 2025 (at 
constant 2007 prices). On the other hand, 
Indonesia is likely to gain substantially under the 
                                                            
4  viz. TPP9 members (Australia, Brunei Darussalam, 
Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United 
States, Vietnam), TPP12 members (TPP9+ Canada, 
Mexico and Japan) and TPP12+ China (13 members) 
Asian track and FTAAP by an estimated 
US$12.8 billion and US$38 billion respectively 
by the year 2025. Similarly, export changes 
under different scenarios show that Indonesia 
would make a loss of US$5.6 billion under the 
present TPP as against a gain of US$32.6 billion 
and US$97.4 billion under the Asian track and 
FTAAP respectively.  
Gajdos (2013) estimated the potential 
economic gains for all the participating countries 
under three alternative scenarios5. Although 
none of these scenarios specifically analyzed the 
gain to Indonesia, but the economic analysis 
reveals that there would be an overall gain (both 
in income and exports) for the TPP countries in 
the alternative track involving Indonesia 
(TPP16). The results show the income gain in 
the TPP16 scenario will be 63% higher and the 
export gain will be 95% higher, over the TPP13 
scenario. Deardorff (2013), while estimating the 
trade implication of TPP on the ASEAN 
economies, argues its effect by taking the 
existing trade relations of each country with the 
present TPP signatories. On the basis of export 
and import figures, he finds that among the 
countries in the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade 
Area), but not in the TPP, countries viz. 
Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand will be harmed the most by its 
implementation, provided they opt out of the 
negotiations. 
Cororation and Orden (2015), while 
estimating the potential economic effect of the 
TPP on the Philippines, included Indonesia as an 
important country in the region. Their study, 
using the GTAP database and CGE modeling 
finds the trade effects on Indonesia under the 
TPP scenario. It finds that the exports from 
Indonesia to the TPP would decline by US$ 0.07 
                                                            
5  'TPP11', present TPP countries excluding Japan ; 
'TPP13', which includes TPP11 as well as Japan and 
South Korea; and 'TPP16', which consists of TPP13 and 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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billion in 2015 and this decline would grow to 
US$0.86 billion by the end of 20246. In the 
present TPP scenario, this trade effect on 
Indonesia is the highest among the ASEAN 
countries. At the same time, it finds that exports 
within the non-TPP countries increase, but not 
enough to offset the drop in exports to the TPP. 
The new estimation by Petri and Plummer 
(2016) finds the impact of the TPP on the 
participant and the non-participating countries 
using a CGE framework. Based on the GTAP 9 
database for 19 sectors and 29 regions, it shows 
that the TPP is likely to increase annual real 
incomes by US$131 billion for the US (0.5% of 
GDP) and annual exports by US$357 billion 
(9.1% of exports) over projections by 2030. It 
finds Indonesia, as a non-member, will lose 
US$2 billion in real income by the year 2030.  
Though these studies have used Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling to find the 
impact of regional trade agreements on both the 
included and the excluded countries, the growing 
criticism of CGE modeling has witnessed the use 
of the partial equilibrium approach in recent 
trade agreement studies. Studies by Banga 
(2014, 2015), for Malaysia and Vietnam 
respectively and Banga and Sahu (2015) for 
India have used the partial equilibrium approach 
to access the impact of the TPPA. These studies 
have cited the limitation of CGE modeling and 
its unrealistic assumptions, which invariably 
lead to the “over-estimation” of gains, especially 
for small developing countries. The limitations 
of CGE modeling are well captured in studies 
viz. Taylor and Arnim (2006), Panagariya and 
Duttagupta (2001), Tokarick (2005), to mention 
a few. Taylor and Arnim (2006), criticize that 
the models are designed in such a way that “the 
price system” will always respond to 
                                                            
6  The findings include the baseline values in 2014 and the 
yearly value difference from the baseline expressed in 
US$ billion at 2007 prices.  
liberalization in a way that leads to an increase 
in overall well-being. Other studies which 
supported the criticism to these assumptions 
include Raza et al (2014), Charlton and Stiglitz 
(2005). Further, Panagariya and Duttagupta 
(2001) argue that the inclusion of the 
“Armington assumption” in all CGE models 
implies that there exists “product differentiation” 
which indicates that no country, howsoever 
small, produces something which is also 
produced by another country in the world. This 
implies that even when the price changes, no 
country can ever shift from exporting to 
importing a commodity. Most importantly, the 
model considers different assumptions with the 
GTAP Database and fails to capture the vertical 
intra-industry trade, and only captures the 
change in horizontal intra-industry trade across 
countries. Taken all these criticisms into 
account, the model grossly overestimates the rise 
in exports, GDP and employment, during the 
post-tariff elimination period. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses the World Bank’s World 
Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) Database. 
This database contains trade data for all the 
countries under a different nomenclature viz. at 
the two-digit, four-digit, and six-digit level. We 
use the HS-classified nomenclature at the six-
digit level in order to estimate the impact of the 
removal of tariffs on Indonesia’s trade, i.e. both 
exports and imports. The purpose of using the 
six-digit HS classification is to estimate the gain 
and loss for each product at a disaggregation 
level. The six-digit HS classification is 
undertaken to find a disaggregated product level 
estimation. Other estimations such as trade 
patterns and tariff structures are also based on 
the HS classification, as reported in the WITS 
Database.  
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from 2000 until 2016, a higher growth compared 
to other major developing countries in the 
region, such as Malaysia and Thailand (World 
Bank Database). Exports played an important 
role in this regard, registering an annual average 
growth by 5.9% during the period 2001-2014 
(World Bank Microdata).  
In terms of trade, Indonesia has increased its 
trade openness, explored several trade 
opportunities and increased its significant trade 
ties with many countries in the region and world 
(Suryahadi et. al. 2012). Over time, trade 
barriers were relaxed and it became more 
globally integrated (Chandra, 2006; Pangestu et 
al 2015). Trade has played a significant role in 
Indonesia’s impressive growth and it is now 
ranked as the 28th largest exporting country in 
the world (World Bank) The gradual reforms via 
deregulation and liberalization have increased 
trade in both its volume and share with many 
countries in the world (Chandra, 2006; Pangestu 
et al 2015). In absolute terms, Indonesia’s 
merchandised trade increased to US$354 billion 
in 2014 from a mere US$87 billion in 2001, an 
estimated 40.7 % growth in terms of the trade to 
GDP ratio (based on WITS database, World 
Bank). Its bilateral trade with China remained 
the highest, followed by Japan and Singapore 
during 2011-2014. About three-fourths of its 
total trade is with Indonesia’s the top ten trade 
partners, of which four out of the top five trade 
destinations are part of the present TPP 
signatories (Table 1). 
More segregated data shows that Indonesia’s 
trade share with Japan has increased 
significantly ever since the latter’s increased 
focus on Asia. Japan remains as its major export 
destination and China remains as the top import 
destination followed by Singapore and Japan, by 
the end of 2014 (based on WITS Database, 
World Bank). Indonesia’s export growth to the 
present TPP bloc, since 2001, remained positive 
until the onset of the financial crisis in 2008. The 
post-crisis period saw a drastic decline, in both 
exports and imports, in 2009, with both its major 
trading partners and the present TPP signatories 
such as Japan, the USA, and Singapore. The key 
mechanism through which the crisis affected the 
Indonesian economy changed the export and 
import volumes, primarily as a result of the 
contraction in world demand/export markets. 
Retrenchments occurred in many of the export-
oriented manufacturing firms of Indonesia. In 
value terms, exports to Japan fell by 49% 
followed by Singapore (25%) and the US (20%). 
Similarly, during the same period, Indonesia’s 
imports from Japan fell by 54%, followed by 
Singapore (40%) and the US (11%). The key 
trade relations with these countries further 
strengthened post 2009 until the year 2011, and 
fell back after that. In terms of the balance of 
trade, Indonesia’s exports to the TPP parties 
remained higher than its imports since the year 
1991, except for in 2012, showing a positive 
trade balance with the TPP countries. 
Table 1. Indonesia's Trade with Top 10 
countries during 2011-2014 (in US$ billions) 
Countries 
Total 
Trade 
Export 
Total 
Import 
Total 
China 200.9 84.8 116.1 
Japan 192.6 114.1 78.5 
Singapore 171.8 69.0 102.8 
United States 103.4 63.7 39.7 
Korea, Rep. 101.9 53.5 48.4 
Malaysia 89.5 42.7 46.8 
India 67.7 51.1 16.5 
Thailand 66.7 24.4 42.3 
Other Asia, nes 42.3 25.1 17.2 
Australia 41.0 19.8 21.2 
Top 10 countries 1077.7 548.2 529.6 
 World 1485.3 752.1 733.2 
Top 10 countries as
% of the world 
72.6 72.9 72.2 
Source: WITS Database, World Bank. 
Ranking is based on the total trade with Indonesia  
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terms, it has increased from over US$100 billion 
in the first half of the nineties to nearly US$317 
billion during 2011-14. Singapore remains as the 
top import destination followed by Japan and the 
USA since the year 1991. 
At the commodity level, the composition of 
imports from the TPP remains much the same, 
with mineral fuels, oils, and products (HS27), 
constituting about 28% of the total import value 
during 2001-2014. In the year 2014, oil and gas 
imports rose sharply, coupled with the negative 
growth in their export, partially offsetting the 
overall contribution of this sector to the trade 
balance. A marginal drop in the total export 
value of fuel and oil products could be due to the 
currency turmoil and the weak macroeconomic 
fundamentals of many economies, leading to a 
fall in the global oil price. Similarly, the non-oil 
imports declined by more than 4% in the year 
2014, part of the decline was in the import of 
manufactured goods, but most of the decline was 
due to non-manufactured items (Figure 5 and 
Table 3). 
3. Indonesia’s Trade Agreements and Tariff 
structure: Special References to TPP 
Indonesia extends Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
treatments to all WTO members. It has 
systematically undertaken several steps to reduce 
its barriers to trade, including promoting 
investment, streamlining procedures at the 
borders and customs reform. The most 
prominent of all is the introduction of 
Indonesia's National Single Window (NSW) in 
2007, which allows for the online processing of 
customs documentation, applications for 
licenses, and duty payments. An estimated 90% 
of the trade entering and leaving Indonesia is 
streamlined through the NSW (World Bank, 
Trade Policy Review 2012). Indonesia has 
enacted new laws relating to its Sanitary and 
Pshyco-sanitary System regime, export financing 
and special economic zones. The major objective 
of its trade policy is to increase the export of 
non-oil products, strengthen the domestic market 
and national distribution channels, shift into 
higher value-added activities and strengthen the 
Table 2. Indonesia's Merchandise Trade with TPP Partners (US$ millions) 
Countries 
Export 
in  
1991 
Export 
in 
2014 
% 
increase 
in Exp. 
Value 
Import 
in  
1991 
Import 
in 
2014 
% 
increase 
in Imp 
Value 
Total 
Export 
(1991-
2014) 
Total 
Import 
(1991-
2014) 
Total 
Trade 
(1991-
2014) 
Trade % 
with TPP 
partner 
1991-2014
Japan 10767 23127 115 6327 17008 169 419414 223697 643111 34.5 
Singapore 2410 16752 595 1698 25186 1383 199500 231780 431280 23.1 
United States 3508 16560 372 3397 8189 141 227977 127746 355723 19.1 
Malaysia 342 9732 2747 407 10855 2569 97381 93547 190928 10.2 
Australia 628 4962 690 1378 5648 310 58304 66146 124451 6.7 
Vietnam 151 2451 1521 87 3418 3820 22302 19219 41521 2.2 
Canada 172 755 339 354 1860 425 11715 21351 33067 1.8 
New Zealand 27 481 1651 117 836 613 5460 8616 14076 0.8 
Brunei* 40 100 154 7 594 8911 946 11614 12561 0.7 
Mexico 57 851 1400 81 187 130 7837 3071 10908 0.6 
Chile 9 178 1957 118 242 106 2573 4260 6833 0.4 
Peru 0 210 128237 2 67 2643 1220 820 2040 0.1 
Total TPP 18110 76161 321 13973 74089 430 1054629 811868 1866497 100.0 
Total TPP as 
% of World 62.1 43.3 63.6 54.0 41.6 73.2 48.9 46.4 47.7 
Source : Authors estimation from WITS Database, World Bank. 
Note : Ranking is based on 1991-2014 aggregate trade with TPP countries 
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ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (ASEAN Econo-
mic Cooperation and ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement); ASEAN-Australia and New 
Zealand (AANZFTA), ASEAN-China, ASEAN-
India, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-Korea, 
Indonesia-Japan EPA (Economic Partnership 
Agreement) and Indonesia-Pakistan FTA. In 
addition, Indonesia has launched six bilateral 
negotiations (with India, Australia, Chile, 
the European Union, Regional Comprehen-
sive Economic Partnership and South 
Korea), one through ASEAN (ASEAN-
Hong Kong, China) and one plurilateral 
(with a group of eight developing countries 
that includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria and 
Turkey). Indonesia has also signed the Trade 
Preferential System of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (TPSOIC), but it did not 
come into effect. Brunei, a part of the present 
TPP, is also a member of the TPSOIC. Indonesia 
is continuing to work together with these 
countries towards achieving the end goals of 
each signed agreement. 
In general, Indonesia has much lower tariffs 
than other developing countries in the world 
(Soesastro and Basri, 2005). As per the 2003 
tariff schedule in HS02 nomenclature, Indonesia 
has bound 95% of its tariffs, and nearly 72% of 
these are bound at 40% or above (TPR 2013). 
Indonesia’s MFN tariff ranges from duty-free to 
150% on some products. Alcoholic beverages 
(34 lines) and food preparations (not elsewhere 
specified, seven lines) face the highest tariff, 
followed by the second highest tariff rate of 90% 
(wine and shandy), and all the other tariffs are 
below 40%. The government had made several 
efforts to achieve its tariff harmonization 
programs, including liberalization of some 
higher tariffs. In 2012, the government replaced 
the nomenclature of its tariff book7 that resulted 
in a 10% reduction in the total number of MFN 
applied tariff lines, compared to Indonesia's 
previous HS2007 nomenclature7. The simple 
average applied tariff (import tariff for all 
countries) of Indonesia, for all products, has 
declined by a significant margin to 6.7% in 
2013, as compared to 9.5% in 2006. For the 
present TPP signatories, the average effectively 
applied tariff (import tariff) of Indonesia, for all 
products, is 4.6%, much lower than that of other 
countries. The same for applies to WTO-HS 
agricultural products and WTO-HS industrial 
products, which are at 4.1% and 4.6% 
respectively. It is interesting to note that 
Indonesia’s tariff for the ASEAN countries 
(party to TPP) is nearly zero. These ASEAN 
countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Vietnam) together account for more than 54% of 
Indonesia’s total imports from the present TPP 
countries. On the other hand, Indonesia faces 
much lower tariffs for its export to the present 
TPP countries, averaged at 2.5% for all products 
(Table 4). 
What is intriguing about the joining, or the 
non-joining, of Indonesia is that it already has 
existing FTAs, or has launched trade agreements 
with two-thirds of the present TPP signatories. 
(Table 4). Whether these FTAs have and will 
result in gains for Indonesia or not is still an 
issue for discussion. But, with the TPP shaping 
for action, the projection of its effects on 
Indonesia’s trade and welfare is a matter of real 
concern. Therefore, the growing trend of mega 
FTAs like the TPPA has necessitated an early 
analysis of its likely trade impacts on Indonesia, 
regardless of it joining or not joining these 
FTAs. 
 
                                                            
7 The nomenclature changed from Indonesian Entry Custom 
Tariff Book (BTBMI) to the Indonesian Custom Tariff 
Book (BTKI) in 2012. This is formulated in accordance 
with the World Custom Organization HS2012 nomen-
clature and the ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomen-
clature (AHTN). 
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Table 4. Indonesia’s FTA status with TPP Countries and Existing Tariff Rate 
Partner Name FTA Status Applied Tariff Rate 
Australia In effect through AFTA 7.41 
Chile Launched but not signed 9.54 
Canada No FTA 7.31 
Brunei AFTA 0.00 
Mexico No FTA 7.55 
New Zealand In effect through AFTA 7.78 
Japan Bilateral and through AFTA 6.99 
Malaysia AFTA 0.08 
Peru No FTA 8.71 
Singapore AFTA 0.43 
United States No FTA 7.05 
Vietnam AFTA 0.04 
Source: FTA status is taken from Asian Development Bank and Tariff from WITS, World Bank 
4. An implication of Tariff Liberalization 
on Indonesia during the post TPPA 
period 
Indonesia’s concerns can be addressed in line of 
the present trade agreements with the countries 
involved in the agreement. Indonesia enjoys 
trade deals with seven countries amongst the 
present TPP signatories, of which four countries 
(Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam) 
belong to AFTA, to which Indonesia is also a 
party, and it also has one regional (ASEAN-
Australia and New Zealand) and one bilateral 
economic partnership agreement with Japan. 
These seven countries together account for more 
than 75% (about US$58 billion in 2014) of 
Indonesia’s exports to the present TPP countries. 
If Indonesia remains out of it, the present twelve 
quite diverse members of the TPP, with the USA 
at the helm of affairs, might face difficulties in 
exporting to the majority of the TPP partners, 
despite having trade deals with more than half of 
them. 
Taking this into consideration, the present 
study examines the likely gain and loss to 
Indonesia using the simulation result in two 
different scenarios. First, the gain/loss in 
exports/imports if Indonesia becomes a part of 
the present TPP signatories, and second, what 
would be the gain/loss if it remains out of the 
present TPP. We first estimate the impact of the 
removal of all six digit product level tariffs in 
the TPPA12 countries. The existing applied 
tariffs are used and all tariffs among the TPPA12 
countries are brought down to zero. The 
rationale behind the use of this approach is based 
on the fact that it allows for the estimation of 
tariff reductions at the six digit disaggregation 
level. The model not only estimates the extent of 
the imports that may come from the TPP 
members into Indonesia if all tariffs are brought 
down to zero, but is also able to provide the 
results at the product level on the trade 
diversion, i.e. from which non-TPP countries 
will the imports be diverted.  
a.  Scenario 1: If Indonesia Joins TPP- 
The estimation based on the 2014 simulation 
reveals that, in the case where Indonesia joins 
the TPP bloc, the exports would rise by over 
US$3.763 billion annually, as against a rise in 
imports of over US$3.784 billion, leaving a net 
deficit of US$19 million in the balance of trade 
with the present TPP bloc. Its imports are likely 
to increase most from Japan (US$2.482 billion) 
followed by the USA (US$878 million) and 
Sahu 
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Australia (US$384 million). However, the export 
rise would be the highest to the USA (US$2.331 
billion) followed by Malaysia (US$705 million) 
and Vietnam (US$241 million). The combined 
effect shows that Indonesia will experience the 
highest trade deficit with Japan (US$2.360 
billion) followed by Australia (US$372 million) 
and New Zealand (US$42 million) and a trade 
surplus with all the other TPP countries. In 
particular, it will experience the highest trade 
surplus with the USA (US$1.453 billion) 
followed by Malaysia (US$739 million) and 
Vietnam (US$251 million). 
At the product level, revenue losses with the 
TPP countries would remain highest for mineral 
fuels, oils and products (HS27; US$426 million) 
followed by boilers, machinery and mechanical 
products (HS84; US$385 million) and vehicles 
other than railway rolling stock, tramway rolling 
stock (HS87; US$335 million) and electrical 
machinery equipment and parts (HS85; US$196 
million). On the other hand, the gain in revenue 
would be highest for the product HS87 (US$784 
million) followed by HS84 product (US$735 
million) and iron and steel (HS72; US$207 
million).  
During the initial phase, Indonesia may 
provide some transitional safeguard measures for 
the industries which are severely affected, due to 
the increased imports as a result of the steep 
tariff cuts. But this support is only for two years, 
with a one-year extension, and must be 
progressively liberalized if they last longer than 
a year. At the same time, Indonesia may have to 
provide mutually agreed compensation to the 
countries if it imposes transitional safeguard 
measures for its domestic industries, as per the 
trade remedies rule under the TPP.  
 
Table 5. Indonesia's Rise in Export and Import if it takes part in TPP (in US$ '000)Countries 
 
Rise in Indonesia's 
Import 
Rise in Export from 
TPP Partners 
Indonesia's Net Trade 
Balance 
Australia 383682 11968 -371714 
Brunei -21 -52 -31 
Canada 69762 145307 75545 
Chile 7507 23714 16207 
Japan 2488347 128485 -2359862 
Malaysia -34145 704665 738810 
Mexico 24627 144756 120129 
New Zealand 52959 10876 -42083 
Peru 1123 24349 23226 
Singapore -76891 -5 76886 
United States 877612 2330723 1453111 
Vietnam -10278 240853 251131 
Total TPP 3784286 3765639 -18647 
Source: Estimated using SMART simulations 
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Table 6. Indonesia's tariff loss due to the increased imports if it takes part in TPP: 
Top ten products (in US$ millions) 
Sl. 
No. 
Product 
HS code Product Description Import Change 
Tariff (Loss In 
Revenue) 
1 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their  29.7 -426.2 
2 84 boilers, mach. & mechanical  486.8 -385.0 
3 87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway Rolling  564.7 -334.5 
4 85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts there  97.2 -196.0 
5 72 Iron and Steel 130.5 -126.5 
6 39 Plastics and articles thereof  111.6 -118.6 
7 73 Articles of iron or steel  114.8 -91.7 
8 29 Organic chemicals  36.0 -68.8 
9 10 Cereals 79.3 -57.5 
10 22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar  20.3 -55.5 
Total (1-97) All Products 2580.1 -2453.7 
Source: Estimated using SMART simulations 
Table 7.  Indonesia's gain in revenue due to the increased export if it takes part in TPP: Top ten 
products (in US$ millions) 
Sl. No Product HS Code Product Description 
Increase In Exp. 
Revenue 
1 87 Vehicles other than railway, tramway Rolling  784.2 
2 84 boilers, mach. & mechanical  735.2 
3 72 Iron and Steel 207.3 
4 73 Articles of iron or steel  186.8 
5 39 Plastics and articles thereof  180.8 
6 85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts there  165.9 
7 21 Miscellaneous edible preparations  119.7 
8 38 Miscellaneous chemical products  112.0 
9 17 Sugar and Sugar Confectionery  103.1 
10 10 Cereals 93.3 
11 40 Rubber and Article thereof  91.3 
Total (1-97) All Products 3778 
Source: Estimated using SMART simulations 
b. Scenario 2: If Indonesia remains out-  
The second scenario shows Indonesia’s trade 
diversion, i.e. the change in exports with the TPP 
countries in its absence. The post TPP tariff 
liberalization would lower the trade costs, 
allowing consumers to access cheaper goods 
from these TPP partners. Similarly, the lower 
tariffs would allow producers to get access to 
cheaper imported materials or supplies, which in 
turn would reduce the prices of the finished 
goods in these markets; effectively affecting 
Indonesia’s exporting potential to the TPP bloc. 
The simulation estimation shows that if 
Indonesia remains out, there is a likely decline in 
its exports by US$413 million annually with the 
TPP countries, because of the trade diversion. 
The highest export loss is predicted to be with 
the USA, followed by Malaysia and Australia. 
The cumulative export loss with these top three 
countries would amount to more than 81% of the 
total export loss with the TPP countries during 
the post TPP implementation.  
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Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business, Vol. 34, No. 1, 2019 33 
 
Table 8. Total Loss of Indonesia with the TPP Countries if it remains out of TPP (In US$ millions) 
TPP Countries Trade Balance (2014) 
Trade Balance Since 
1991 Post TPP Export loss 
Australia -685 -7842 -8.8 
Brunei -494 -10668 -0.1 
Canada -1105 -9636 -9.8 
Chile -64 -1687 -2.7 
Malaysia -1124 3834 -104.9 
Japan 6120 195716 -49.1 
Mexico 663 4767 -29.7 
New Zealand -355 -3156 -1.9 
Peru 144 400 -2.2 
Singapore -8434 -32280 0.0 
United States 8372 100231 -182.1 
Vietnam -967 3084 -21.6 
Total 2071 242762 -413 
Source: Estimated using SMART simulations 
Stated differently, the estimation reveals that 
the post TPP scenario would decrease the 
present trade surplus from US$2 billion to 
US$1.6 billion if Indonesia does not become a 
party to the TPP bloc. However, this does not 
take into account the “yarn forward rule” of 
origin in the TPP, which requires thread and 
fabric, etc. to come from TPP countries and 
therefore restricts the amount that existing TPP 
countries can increase their exports of clothing 
to the US.  
CONCLUSION 
Trade agreements seem to have benefited 
Indonesia’s economy and its people in many 
ways over the years, even though it has an 
important cost for some people. The present 
findings, in the context of the joining or non-
joining of Indonesia, show that even with 
Indonesia’s non-participation in the TPP, it will 
still have a trade surplus in goods of US$1.6 
billion with the TPP countries. However, if 
Indonesia becomes a party to the agreement, the 
goods trade surplus would turn into a trade 
deficit of US$19 million. As evident from our 
findings, Indonesia’s trade balance is likely to 
widen if it joins the TPP, compared to staying 
out of it. It is not clear where or how Indonesia 
can benefit from the TPP in a way that can 
compensate for the likely losses to Indonesia. 
For example, the TPP's intellectual property 
chapter alone will keep the prices of medicines 
and textbooks high in Indonesia for longer, and 
increase the cost of materials for Indonesian 
farmers and manufacturers (Sahu, 2016, Jakarta 
Post).  
The tariff loss in the post TPPA without 
Indonesia is large, because of the trade diversion 
and can be attributed to two reasons. First, the 
tariff liberalization lowers the trade costs, 
allowing the consumers to access cheaper goods 
from these TPP partners. Second, the lower 
tariffs allow the producers to get access to 
cheaper imported materials or parts, which in 
turn reduce the prices of their finished goods. 
This may well affect Indonesia’s exports to these 
countries, as the production of low-cost 
competitive products cannot happen overnight, 
given the fact that there exist bottlenecks in the 
infrastructure, including in transport, power, and 
water.  
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Even with Indonesia’s existing trade agree-
ments, Indonesia may face difficulties to export 
to these markets under a new international 
standard of its own. Although Indonesia joining 
the TPPA may not offer many gains in terms of 
its trade balance, but opting out of it may cost 
more in the long run. In case the countries who 
have expressed their interest, viz. Thailand, the 
Philippines, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambo-
dia, South Korea, and Colombia do join the club 
in the future, the trading loss could rise 
substantially and limit Indonesia’s trade 
prospects with these Pacific Rim countries. 
Further, the cost could be even higher if 
Indonesia is unable to complete or withdraws 
from some of its ongoing trade negotiations. 
Along with the future trade limitations, 
Indonesia may also lose out on linking into 
global value chains, due to the TPP’s rules on 
standards for labor and environmental policies. 
As the TPP gets bigger, Indonesian exports to 
the TPP markets may require additional testing, 
which increases the cost and time to access these 
markets, thereby undermining the competi-
tiveness of Indonesian products in these markets.  
The participation of big markets like the 
USA, Canada, Japan and Australia in the TPP, 
along with other developing countries may 
increase their capacity to influence WTO 
outcomes, and thereby limit Indonesia’s future 
prospects of trade growth if it remains out. Most 
significantly, the TPP may isolate Indonesia 
from being a significant export partner with the 
US, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, with 
whom it enjoys preferential access.  
Similarly, the TPP's investment chapter has 
strong protection for foreign investments, 
including providing investor-to-state dispute 
settlements with the most litigious investor in the 
world, the US, who have a 98% chance of a 
broad interpretation of their rights in these 
disputes, and the TPP sets no maximum limit on 
the damages the governments have to pay them 
(e.g. one country recently had 180 days to pay a 
foreign investor US$50 billion under provisions 
equivalent to those in the TPP). These TPP 
investment chapter provisions are equivalent to 
those in Indonesia's bilateral investment treaties, 
which have proven to be so problematic that 
Indonesia is currently withdrawing from them. 
Indonesia will not be able to change these TPP 
rules if it joins the TPP. Considering all these 
factors, it is evident from the estimation that 
joining the TPPA will lead to a rise in imports, 
as compared to exports. But Indonesia’s gain 
from other chapters of the TPP during the post 
TPP scenario will be clearer once it comes into 
effect by early 2018.  
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